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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 836 (1993)

INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 5 of its resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, the Security Council decided to ensure full respect for the safe areas referred to in resolution 824 (1993) - Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla and Zepa - and extended the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to deter attacks against these safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military and paramilitary units and to occupy some key points on the ground, in addition to the protection of humanitarian convoys under resolution 776 (1992). In paragraph 7 of resolution 836 (1993), the Council requested the Secretary-General to redeploy to the extent possible or to reinforce UNPROFOR to implement the resolution and, in paragraph 8, it invited the Secretary-General to seek additional contingents from Member States for that purpose. In paragraph 9, the Council authorized UNPROFOR to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in self-defence, in reply to bombardments of or armed incursions into the safe areas, or to any deliberate obstruction of the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys. In paragraphs 10 and 11, the Council authorized Member States to take, in close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures through the use of air power to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate. The present report is submitted in response to paragraph 12 of the resolution and seeks to provide the Council with an analysis of the modalities for implementation of the resolution.

I. ANALYSIS OF TASKS

2. It is assumed that the tasks being carried out under the existing UNPROFOR mandate for Bosnia and Herzegovina must continue to be performed. A combination of these functions and the additional responsibilities entrusted to UNPROFOR in resolution 836 (1993) suggests that additional troops would be necessary to perform the following tasks in specific relation to the safe areas:

(a) Deterrence of attacks;

(b) Monitoring of the cease-fire;

(c) Promotion of the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(d) Occupation of key points;

(e) Protection of humanitarian relief delivery and distribution.

3. In order to establish the capacity to perform these tasks, UNPROFOR will need to deploy within the safe areas, around their perimeters and at key points outside them, in order:

(a) To monitor and control access to the safe areas by means of checkpoints, where access roads cross the perimeters of those areas, and at other important points;

(b) To offer a response, as necessary and practicable, to attacks against the safe areas against convoys to and from such safe areas, and against UNPROFOR personnel;

(c) To monitor the safe areas for possible breaches of the cease-fire and discourage such breaches;

(d) To monitor surrounding areas in order to detect current military actions and future intentions;

(e) To patrol and monitor areas from which units might be withdrawn, so as to ensure that they remain demilitarized.

4. The operational concept for keeping the safe areas safe, and the number of troops required for this purpose, will be determined by the degree of cooperation which it is assumed that the belligerent parties will provide. It is however clear that, regardless of troop levels, UNPROFOR forces must be equipped with both the means necessary for self-defence against any likely threat and the physical protection needed to perform essential tasks in relative safety. Any forces deployed must therefore possess appropriate levels of protection, mobility and fire-power. Since it is assumed that UNPROFOR ground troops will not be sufficient to resist a concentrated assault on any of the safe areas, particular emphasis must be placed on the availability of a credible air-strike capability provided by Member States. This would require the deployment of Forward Air Controllers (FACs) in order that the force-multiplying characteristics of air power may be fully exploited if necessary. In keeping with the provisions of paragraph 10 of resolution 836 (1993), I have asked the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is already assisting the United Nations in the implementation of several earlier Security Council resolutions, to prepare plans for provision of the necessary air support capacity, in close coordination with me and my Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia. In a letter dated 11 June 1993 from its Deputy Secretary-General, NATO confirmed its willingness to offer "protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR in the performance of its overall mandate, if it so requests."

II. ADDITIONAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS

5. A military analysis by UNPROFOR has produced a number of options for the implementation of resolution 836 (1993), with corresponding force levels. In order to ensure full respect for the safe areas, the Force Commander of UNPROFOR estimated an additional troop requirement at an indicative level of approximately 34,000 to obtain deterrence through strength. However, it would be possible to start implementing the resolution under a "light option" envisaging a minimal troop reinforcement of around 7,600. While this option cannot, in itself, completely guarantee the defence of the safe areas, it relies on the threat of air action against any belligerents. Its principal advantage is that it presents an approach that is most likely to correspond to the volume of troops and material resources which can realistically be expected from Member States and which meets the imperative need for rapid deployment. It could form the core of a subsequent increased presence in the event that further troop reinforcements become necessary.

6. This option therefore represents an initial approach and has limited objectives. It assumes the consent and cooperation of the parties and provides a basic level of deterrence, with no increase in the current levels of protection provided to convoys of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It does however maintain provision for the use of close air support for self-defence and as a supplementary deterrent to attacks on the safe areas. The additional requirement is for two mechanized battalions in the Sarajevo area, one mechanized battalion in each of the Gorazde and Tuzla areas, and one mechanized battalion in order to control the Metkovic-Mostar-Sarajevo route, with UNPROFOR's presence in Srebrenica, Zepa and Bihac depending essentially on existing resources. At the present stage, therefore, the basic requirements, including support units, are as follows:

1	composite headquarters and headquarters company (250 all ranks) to strengthen the command and control capacity of UNPROFOR's Bosnia and Herzegovina Command
5	mechanized infantry battalions (900 all ranks each; 4 for safe areas/1 for route control)
1	armoured reconnaissance battalion (450 all ranks; with 4 recce squadrons, 110 all ranks each)
1	air unit (200 all ranks, with helicopters for air reconnaissance and casualty evacuation)
1	signals unit (150 all ranks)
1	logistics battalion (400 all ranks)
1	field engineer battalion (300 all ranks; with 2 field engineer companies for mine clearance and construction and road maintenance and 1 logistics unit)
1	medical unit (250 all ranks).

The above amounts to some 7,600 personnel at the present stage. This includes the reinforcement of the infantry battalions in Sarajevo by an additional 500 all ranks each in two cases and by an additional 100 all ranks in the case of the third battalion, together with the necessary equipment. The construction of winterized accommodation for these troops will also be essential. A total of 60 additional civilian personnel (20 international Professional, 20 General Service and 20 local staff) will also be required. Depending on UNPROFOR's experience in the safe areas, additional civil police and military observer needs may in due course be identified.

7. On the basis of initial contacts with Member States, I am hopeful of obtaining most of the military personnel immediately required. Several potential troop-contributing countries have, however, indicated difficulties in providing the equipment that would be essential for their personnel to deploy in these areas. Without the armoured personnel carriers, other vehicles, communications and other essential equipment, weapons systems and logistic support integral to an efficient mechanized and armoured battalion, the tasks envisaged simply cannot be performed. I would therefore appeal to Member States, especially those that are not in a position to provide additional troops, to make contributions of such equipment. I would also ask for them to consider making available air transportation for the deployment of troops and equipment free of cost or at competitive commercial rates. In the absence of such support, I am concerned that the acquisition and deployment of the necessary elements would take so long as to undermine the very purpose of the resolution. It need hardly be emphasized that the troops can be deployed only when the necessary equipment is available and they have been trained in its use prior to deployment in the mission area.

III. OBSERVATIONS

8. As the analysis above indicates, the implementation of resolution 836 (1993) will require the deployment of additional troop resources on the ground as well as the provision of air support. I have initiated contacts with Member States to solicit contributions in both respects and have invited NATO to coordinate with me the use of air power in support of UNPROFOR. It is of course understood that the first decision to initiate the use of air resources in this context will be taken by the Secretary-General in consultation with the members of the Security Council.

9. I would recommend that the Security Council approve the arrangements outlined above. I shall of course keep the situation under constant review and return to the Council should additional deployment be required and prove feasible.

10. At the same time, I should like to recall the overwhelming importance of seeking a comprehensive political solution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is essential that the parties work with the international community to end the war and offer a future of peace and progress to all the suffering peoples in that area. A negotiated and equitable settlement would enable the international community to devote its resources to reconstruction and

development rather than to successive expansions of the United Nations military activities in the former Yugoslavia. In this connection I commend the efforts of the co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

11. Preliminary estimates of the costs of the proposals contained in the present report will be circulated shortly as an addendum.